Spring 2011: Oil Spill Commission cites avoidable 'management failure' as Macondo blowout cause

An advance chapter from the National Oil Spill Commission's full report due out Jan. 11 cites "a single overarching failure - a failure of management" among all three companies as the underlying cause of the April Macondo well blowout.

"Better management by BP, Halliburton and Transocean would almost certainly have prevented the blowout by improving the ability of individuals involved to identify the risks they faced, and to properly evaluate, communicate and address them."

Chancellor Fran Ulmer was appointed to the commission by President Barack Obama and participated in the investigation and analysis. She will be in Washington D.C. for the release of the report next week. "The Deepwater Horizon blowout cost society a huge loss in human, environmental and economic terms. We believe that the proposals suggested by our Commission represent a modest investment in prevention, so that we do not incur such unacceptable costs again. We have focused primarily on the Gulf, but that is not the only area of concern. Oil exploration will expand into deeper waters and new frontiers around the world, like the Arctic region. Oil is economically and strategically important to this nation, but we must improve both industry operation and government regulation to guarantee human and environmental safety."

Commission Co-Chair William K. Reilly said the management problem is systemic. "So a key question posed from the outset by this tragedy is, do we have a single company, BP, that blundered with fatal consequences, or a more pervasive problem of a complacent industry? Given the documented failings of both Transocean and Halliburton, both of which serve the offshore industry in virtually every ocean, I reluctantly conclude we have a system-wide problem."

Co-Chair Bob Graham said regulators lacked "the capacity and will to demand world class safety standards."

The chapter is available as a PDF on the homepage of the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and Offshore Drilling website.

Among the examples of engineering mistakes and management failures highlighted in the chapter:

• Inadequate risk evaluation and management of late-stage well design decisions;
• A flawed design for the cement slurry used to seal the bottom of the well, which was developed without adequate engineering review or operator supervision;
• A "negative pressure test," conducted to evaluate the cement seal at the bottom of the well, identified problems but was incorrectly judged a success because of insufficiently rigorous test procedures and inadequate training of key personnel;
• Flawed procedures for securing the well that called for unnecessarily removing drilling mud from the wellbore. If left in place, that drilling mud would have helped prevent hydrocarbons from entering the well and causing the blowout;
• Apparent inattention to key initial signals of the impending blowout; and
• An ineffective response to the blowout once it began, including but not limited to a failure of the rig's blowout preventer to close off the well.

The chapter also notes, "Whether purposeful or not, many of the decisions that BP, Halliburton and Transocean made that increased the risk of the Macondo blowout clearly saved those companies significant time (and money)."

Co-Chair Graham said the accident can activate a new resolve for safety.

"There is nothing that we can do to bring back the lives of the men we lost that day," said Graham.  "But we can honor their memory by pledging to take steps necessary to avoid repeating the fatal practices of the past."